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We investigated the role of global discourse organization on the comprehension of 
temporal order in narrative. We proposed three principles of discourse organization: 
(a) the immediate integration principle—a new event should be integrated 
immediately with old information, (b) the consistency principle—a new event 
should be attached to a consistent locus, and (c) the isomorphism principle—
discourse structure should match event structure. Five passages varying in discourse 
structure were presented auditorily, and the comprehension of the underlying event 
order was tested. Subjects’ comprehension was best in the canonical passage. The 
backward, flashback, and embedded passages were significantly more difficult than 
the canonical passages. The flashforward passage was the most difficult. The results 
were interpreted as showing that the immediate integration principle is a strong 
component of comprehension of temporal order and that the isomorphism principle 
contributes to text comprehension, but to a lesser degree. 
 
The purpose of the present experiment is to investigate the role of global discourse 
organization on the comprehension of temporal order in narrative texts using 
experimental narratives in which discourse order and event order were not confounded. 
To study global discourse structure, we believe that it is necessary to make a clear 
distinction between the events in the underlying event world and the linguistic 
representation of these events in a narrative text. The organization of the events in the 
underlying event world will be referred to as the event structure (E-1, E-2, E-3, etc.), and 
the temporal arrangements of these events in the text will be referred to as the discourse 
structure (e-1, e-2, e-3, etc.). For example, given an underlying event sequence such as, 
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[E-1] Sara saw a bear, [E-2] Sara walked through the trees, [E-3] Sara saw a campfire, 
one could organize these events into a text such as, “[e-1] Sara saw a bear. [e-2] After 
this, she walked through the trees. [e-3] Next she saw a campfire.” Or the same events 
could be organized into a text such as “[e-3] Sara saw a campfire. [e-2] Right before she 
saw the campfire, Sara had walked through the trees. [e-1] Immediately before this, she 
had seen a bear.” 
 
EVENT STRUCTURE VERSUS DISCOURSE STRUCTURE 
 
Scholars in the humanities interested in the structure of text have frequently made a 
distinction between the structure of events and the structure of narrative. The Russian 
Formalists (e.g., Tomashevsky, 1925/1965) were very clear on this point; they referred to 
the underlying events as the fabula and the events as ordered in the text as the syuzhet 
(see Erlich, 1980; Lemon & Reis, 1965, for additional details). The distinction has 
continued to play an important role in the analysis of narrative by Structuralist scholars. 
Thus, the French Structuralist, Genette (1972/1980) uses the terms histoire and récit, 
whereas the American Structuralist, Chatman (1978) uses the term story and discourse. 
The scholars in this literary tradition make a number of compelling arguments for this 
distinction. They have pointed out that: (a) there must be a conceptual distinction 
between a (real or imagined) event and the linguistic description of the event, (b) the 
same sets of underlying events have been arranged by different authors into very different 
narratives, and (c) without this distinction one cannot give an appropriate analysis of 
common narrative conventions such as “flashbacks” and “flashforwards.” 
 One recent approach to the study of the global aspects of narratives by 
psychologists was the attempt to write story grammars for narrative text. Initially, 
researchers in this area focused their attention on how higher order knowledge 
concerning the structure of stories facilitates narrative text comprehension and memory. 
For example, story grammars were proposed as attempts to describe the higher order 
structure that is used to encode, represent, and retrieve information from narratives. The 
initial papers in this tradition (Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1975; Stein & 
Glenn, 1979) did not make a consistent distinction between the structure of the 
underlying events and the structure of the narrative text. However, later papers (e.g., 
Johnson & Mandlcr, 1980) have postulated a number of “transformational” rules that 
embody a distinction somewhat similar to that between event structure and discourse 
structure. 
 Researchers in the area of text comprehension (Kieras, 1981; Kintsch & van Dijk, 
1978; Kintsch & Vipond, 1979; Miller & Kintsch, 1980) have proposed the most detailed 
psychological processing models of reading comprehension; however, these models have 
not always made a clear event/discourse distinction. These researchers argue that the 
reader constructs a text base by connecting the propositions that share arguments to form 
a coherence graph. Kintsch and van Dijk (1978) and Kintsch and Vipond (1979) 
developed a microprocess model which suggests three possible sources of reading 
difficulty during the process of text-base construction: reinstatement searches, 
reorganization of coherent graphs, and the occurrence of unconnected graphs. In more 
recent work, van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) do introduce an event/discourse distinction. 
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However, it is not clear how well this new position is integrated with the earlier detailed 
model of text-based microprocesses. 
 Several other theories of global discourse structure have made a clear distinction 
between underlying events and the discourse presentation of events. Some of these 
theories (Brewer & Lichtenstein, 1981, 1982; van Dijk, 1976, 1977) were explicitly 
influenced by the work on text in humanities (see the first paragraph in this section), 
whereas for other theories (Johnson-Laird, 1980, 1983) the distinction arose out of an 
independent analysis of the nature of mental representation. Brewer has argued that the 
event/discourse distinction should play an important role in understanding how global 
discourse organization affects text comprehension (Bock & Brewer, 1985; Brewer, 1980; 
Brewer & Lichtenstein, 1982). Brewer assumes that discourse comprehension should be 
viewed as a process in which a writer/speaker expresses a mental model of the world in 
discourse form and then a reader/hearer attempts to extract the mental model from the 
discourse. Within this framework successful comprehension occurs when the reader 
constructs a mental model from the text that contains the essential aspects of the writer’s 
original mental model (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983). 
 
 
GLOBAL DISCOURSE STRUCTURE 
 
Obviously, the overall process of text comprehension is very complex and includes many 
levels of analysis. To extract the writer’s mental model the reader has to analyze the text 
at the levels of orthography, word meaning, syntax, propositions, and so forth (Bock & 
Brewer, 1985; Just & Carpenter, 1977; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). However, in this 
article, we focus on the impact of global discourse structure on the comprehension of 
temporal order in narratives, Brewer (1980) has pointed out that the author of a text has a 
number of fundamental options in organizing the discourse structure with respect to the 
underlying event structure. For example, the author can omit information from the 
discourse structure and thus leave the reader to make bridging inferences to recover the 
underlying sequence of events. Another important option that is available to authors is the 
ability to arrange the underlying events in the text in essentially any order that the author 
wishes. If the reader is to comprehend a narrative text, the reader must be able to derive 
the underlying event sequence from the given text sequence. It is this process of deriving 
underlying models from text that is the focus of this study. In particular, we investigated 
the effects of global discourse organization of narrative texts on comprehension of 
temporal order. 
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES OF EVENT 
AND NARRATIVE STRUCTURE 
 
The initial experimental studies on global narrative organization were by Kintsch, 
Mandel, and Kozminsky (1977), Stein and Nezworski (1978), and Thorndyke (1977). 
These experiments showed that narrative texts with sentences (or paragraphs) in random 
order are harder to comprehend or remember than are the original passages. Although 
these studies demonstrated that there are structures beyond the level of individual 
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sentences that play a role in text comprehension and memory, these studies were not 
analytic with respect to what is causing these effects. 
 The experiments were developed and interpreted without taking into account the 
distinction between event structure and discourse structure. Simply randomizing the order 
of sentences or paragraphs in a passage confounds these two aspects of discourse because 
it produces changes in both the discourse structure and the underlying event structure. 
Another problem with these studies is that they used narratives that described script- or 
plan-based events (Lichtenstein & Brewer, 1980; Schank & Abelson, 1977). Some of 
these underlying event types have much more structure than others, so that the 
comprehension difficulty in these studies is probably related to the degree of constraint 
imposed by the different structures. The greater the degree of underlying structure, the 
easier it should be for the subjects to put the randomized pieces back together. This 
interpretation is supported by the fact that there were strong effects of passage type 
(which expressed different types of underlying structure) in both the Thorndyke (1977) 
and the Kintsch et al. (1977) studies. 
 The final difficulty with these experiments relates to the issue of discourse 
cohesion. Natural languages contain a wide variety of linguistic structures which are used 
to establish coreference across sentence boundaries (Halliday & Hasan, 1976). The 
procedure of taking the sentences in a linguistically cohesive text and simply changing 
their order also manipulates this aspect of discourse.  For example, in the sample 
narrative text given earlier in this article the following sequence occurs: “[e-1] Sara saw a 
bear. [e-2] After this, she walked through the trees.” In this cohesive text the linguistic 
marker “after this” is used to establish that, at the level of events, [E-2] Sara walked 
through the trees occurred after the event [E-1] Sara saw a bear. Clearly, if the sentence, 
“After this, she walked through the trees,” were moved randomly to some other location 
in a text, it would lead the reader to establish a wrong coreference or to be unable to 
identify any coreferent.  As a result, the reader would construct a mental model that does 
not correspond to the event structure intended by the author. Thus, the designs used in 
these reordering studies also include effects on comprehension due to a disruption of 
linguistic cohesion as an additional confounding variable.
4
 
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES OF DISCOURSE ORGANIZATION 
 
This review of studies on event and discourse organization shows that in order to 
understand the impact of discourse organization on text comprehension it is necessary to 
avoid confounding discourse organization with the other aspects of global text structure. 
The problem of linguistic cohesion is relatively easy to solve. One can simply make sure 
that the experimental materials make appropriate use of the linguistic devices that 
establish coreference.   However, separating the influence of event structure from 
discourse structure is more difficult. One solution to this problem is to use texts that 
contain purely model-based underlying structures instead of schema-based structures. 
Brewer (1987) has argued that these two types of global knowledge structures can be 
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distinguished in terms of when the knowledge structure is constructed: Schemas refer to 
prestored generic information, whereas models are constructed at the time of input. As an 
extreme example of the problem with using schema-based structures, imagine an 
experiment on narrative structure in which the underlying event sequence in the text is a 
restaurant script (e.g., “Fred gave his order to the waiter. Fred ate his salad.”). Suppose 
comprehension or memory experiments are carried out using this text and show that the 
reader knows that the underlying event [E-2] Fred ate his salad occurred after [E-1] Fred 
gave his order to the waiter; it is not obvious whether one is actually testing narrative text 
comprehension, because the order information is also available from generic knowledge 
about restaurants in long-term memory.  However, if a model-based text (e.g., “[e-1] Fred 
mailed the letter. [e-2] Later, Fred got a haircut”) is used and testing shows that the reader 
knows that in the underlying event sequence [E-1] Fred mailed the letter occurred before 
[E-2] Fred got a haircut, then the information must have been obtained by 
comprehending the given narrative text because the order information is not available 
from prestored generic knowledge in long-term memory. Most of the early studies that 
manipulated text order (Kintsch et al., 1977; Stein & Nezworski, 1978; Thorndyke, 1977) 
and many of the more recent studies (Mandler & Goodman, 1982; Stein & Glenn, 1982) 
have used narrative texts that contained largely schema-based underlying structures. 
 One of the few studies that has investigated discourse organization of texts with 
purely model-based structures is the work of Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird (1982). Ehrlich 
and Johnson-Laird propose a general principle of discourse organization (a principle of 
“referential continuity”). They hypothesize that text which is organized so that new 
information can be related to an already constructed model is easier to comprehend and 
recall than text organized so that new information cannot initially be related to an already 
constructed model. They carried out a series of experiments using descriptions of a 
spatial array and found that texts which violated the principle of referential continuity 
(e.g., “The knife is in front of the pot. The glass is behind the dish. The pot is on the left 
of the glass.”) were harder to understand and remember than texts which obeyed the 
principle (e.g., “The knife is in front of the pot. The pot is on the left of the glass. The 
glass is behind the dish.”). 
 In the next section, we extend the theoretical framework of Ehrlich and Johnson-
Laird (1982) and propose a number of general principles of discourse organization. 
However, in doing this, we propose principles that are in direct opposition to some of the 
theoretical statements in Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird’s paper. In particular, Ehrlich and 
Johnson-Laird proposed that once one takes into account the principle of referential 
continuity, “the order in which sentences or referents occurred in the text has no bearing 
on the construction of the representation” (p. 298). This statement may not be 
generalizable to narrative comprehension. By examining whether subjects successfully 
make order inferences in the opposite direction to the mental model built from text, 
Ohtsuka (1990) reported that the mental model built from descriptive text is a two-
dimensional global spatial model, whereas the model from narrative text is a one-
dimensional path.  Morrow (1985, 1986) has shown that readers use different strategies to 
determine the referents of ambiguous pronouns in descriptive and in narrative texts. 
Taken together, these results suggest that the processes of mental model building, as well 
as the constructed models, differ depending on genres. The Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird 
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study used spatial descriptive text, and this choice of genre may be the reason why 
sentence order did not matter in their study. 
 In the next section we propose three principles of discourse organization and 
suggest how each principle is related to discourse comprehension. We describe the three 
principles, which are nested in each other, in the descending order of influence they 
contribute to the comprehension of event order. 
 
 
PRINCIPLES OF DISCOURSE ORGANIZATION 
 
The Immediate Integration Principle 
Discourse comprehension is facilitated by introducing new information into the discourse 
so that it can be integrated immediately into an already constructed model of underlying 
event structure. For example, when a text has introduced underlying events E-2, E-3, and 
E-4, comprehension will be facilitated if the next event introduced is either E-5 or E-1, 
because these two events could be integrated immediately to the already established 
model of event structure. On the other hand, introducing E-6 at this point would violate 
the immediate integration principle because it cannot be integrated immediately. We 
assume that violations of this principle cause strong reductions in comprehension by 
forcing the hearer/reader to hold information in working memory until it can be 
integrated into the developing structure. This psychological processing assumption has 
been included in a number of models of text comprehension (Ehrlich & Johnson- 
Laird, 1982; Kieras, 1978, 1981; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978).  Our immediate integration 
principle is essentially equivalent to Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird’s principle of referential 
continuity. This principle can also be thought of as a form of the given-new principle 
(Clark & Haviland, 1977). 
 
The Consistency Principle 
Discourse comprehension is facilitated by organizing discourse so that new information 
is attached to an already constructed mental model of event structure at a consistent 
locus. The consistency principle is nested under the immediate integration principle and 
assumes its operation. For example, with a text that has already introduced underlying 
events E-2, E-3, and E-4, the introduction of E-5, then E-6, and then E-7 would follow 
the consistency principle because the event model is built in one direction. On the other 
hand, introducing E-5, then E-1, then E-6 after the establishment of event model, E-2, E-
3, and E-4, would violate the principle. Although the latter example conforms to the 
immediate integration principle, new elements are added at different loci on the event 
model when new information is being attached. In the terms of Kintsch and van Dijk 
(1978) this principle suggests that text will be more difficult to comprehend if the 
information in the “leading edge” moves with respect to the already constructed event 
structure. We assume that the violation of this principle forces the hearer/reader to move 
the locus of structure construction, with a possible drain of memory resources, leading to 
difficulty in the construction of the underlying structure. 
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The Isomorphism Principle 
Discourse comprehension is facilitated by having a discourse structure map 
isomorphically onto (i.e., match) the underlying event structure. For example, introducing 
three underlying events in the other E-1, then E-2, and then E-3 would be consistent with 
the isomorphism principle, but introducing the events in reverse order E-3, then E-2, and 
then B-i would violate the principle. This principle is essentially identical with the 
principle of “experiential iconicism” proposed by Enkvist (1981) in which “elements of 
language are ordered to make a text isomorphic with the universe it describes” (p. 98). To 
apply this principle, one must, of course, have some knowledge about the structure of the 
information that underlies a particular form of discourse. This may be difficult for some 
types of discourse, such as expository texts, but is relatively straightforward for narrative 
texts. In fact, Brewer (1985) has proposed that a universal property of narratives designed 
primarily for comprehension is that “the order of events in the discourse will map the 
order of the underlying events” (p. 187). We hypothesize that violations of this principle 
make construction of the underlying structure by the hearer/reader more difficult. 
 We assume that the comprehension of narrative texts requires the construction of 
an appropriate underlying event sequence from the surface discourse structure. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that violations of any of these three principles of discourse organization 
will reduce the ability of the hearer/reader to construct the intended mental model of 
underlying event structure and lead to reduced comprehension. 
 
  
OVERALL EXPERIMENTAL PLAN 
 
The goal of the present experiment was to examine the impact of violations of each of the 
hypothesized principles of discourse organization on comprehension for the genre of 
narrative text. The basic approach was to establish a particular underlying event 
sequence, construct narrative texts with different discourse organizations from this event 
sequence, and then test the difficulty of comprehension of each type of narrative 
organization. We used ecologically valid temporal structures found in narratives as much 
as possible. In keeping with the methodological arguments outlined previously, we used 
passages with underlying event sequences that have no temporally predictable relations 
among events and have used the appropriate forms of discourse coreference to form 
cohesive texts. There were five types of passages, each with a different discourse 
organization. Each type of passage describes the same starting and ending event in the 
underlying event structure. The orders of presentation of events between these two 
anchor points differ in the five types of passages. Currently, it is not clear what 
contribution each principle actually provides to the overall comprehension process.  For 
simplicity, we will assume that each of the three principles plays an equal and additive 
role in the process of comprehending temporal order in narrative texts. 
 
Canonical Passages 
In the canonical passages, the order of events in the narrative (e-1, e-2, e-3) was mapped 
directly onto the underlying event order (E-1, E-2, E-3). The discourse structure of 
canonical passages allows the immediate integration of new information, is consistent in 
the locus of mental model construction, and maps isomorphically onto the underlying 
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event structure. This form of narrative organization follows all three principles and thus 
should be the easiest form of narrative passage to understand. 
 
Backward Passages 
In the backward passages, the order of the events in the narrative was given in reverse 
order (e-3, e-2, e-1) from the underlying event order (E-1, E-2, E-3). This text 
manipulation violates the isomorphism principle because the narrative order does not 
map the direction of the underlying event order. The backward passages violate neither 
the immediate integration principle nor the consistency principle in mental model 
construction. The reader should be able to attach new information to the beginning of an 
already constructed mental model in an orderly manner, even though the narratives 
present the information from the last event to the initial event in terms of the underlying 
event sequence. This form of narrative organization should be the second easiest form of 
narrative passage to understand. 
 
Flashback Passages 
In the flashback passages, the order of events in the narrative was in canonical order, but 
an event was omitted from the discourse and given later in the narrative (e-1, e-3, e-4, e-
2).  These passages were designed so that readers would initially be able to construct an 
underlying structure, E-1, E-3, and only later learn that it was necessary to insert E-2 into 
this already constructed model. This form of narrative organization requires 
comprehenders to reorganize models as they build mental representations. It violates the 
consistency principle because the locus of model construction shifts each time there is a 
flashback in the passage. This form of narrative organization also violates the 
isomorphism principle. Therefore, this type of narrative organization should be more 
difficult to understand than the backward passages. 
 
Embedded Passages 
In the embedded passages, the text introduced an event from the middle of the underlying 
event sequence after the starting statement. The narrative continued with the next 
following underlying event; however, the narrative then gave the underlying event that 
preceded the initial event and continued in embedded form (e-3, e-4, e-2, e-5, e-1). This 
type of narrative organization provides a strong violation of the consistency principle 
because the locus of structure construction shifts repeatedly from one end of the already 
constructed structure to the other.  This organization also violates the isomorphism 
principle because half of the narrative events are given in reverse order from the 
underlying event order (E-l, E-2, E-3, E-4, E-5). Therefore, we expected the 
comprehension of the embedded passages to be similar to that of the flashback passages. 
 
Flasbforward Passages 
In the flashforward passages, the text started with the narrative events (e-1, e-2) given in 
canonical order. The narrative then introduced an event that occurred later in the 
underlying event sequence (e-5). Then, by describing the immediately following event (e-
3), flashforward passages continued in canonical order (e-1, e-2, e-5, e-3, e-4). This form 
of discourse organization violates the immediate integration principle because the 
information in the flashforward portion (e-5) is new information that cannot yet be 
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attached to an already constructed underlying event structure. These passages also violate 
the consistency and isomorphism principles. Because this type of narrative organization 
violates all three principles, we predicted it to be the most difficult to comprehend. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
Subjects 
The subjects were 100 undergraduate university students who participated in the 
experiment to fulfill a course requirement. They were all native speakers of English. 
 
Materials 
 
 Underlying Events. Two underlying event sequences were developed: A walk in 
the forest, and A day in the life of the president. Each event sequence contained 14 events 
that were not structured in terms of script information or plan information. Thus, for 
example, in the A day in the life of the president event sequence, the first three events 
were; [E-1] President declared National Pickle Week, [E-2] President met with Miss 
America, and [E-3] President walked in Rose Garden. A set of five narrative passages 
was developed from each event sequence. Each set contained one narrative with each of 
five different forms of global discourse structure: (a) canonical, (b) backward, (c) 
flashback, (d) embedded, and (e) flashforward. The passages derived from the A walk in 
the forest sequence of events are given in the Appendix. 
 
 Canonical Passages. Two passages with canonical narrative organization were 
developed, one from each underlying event sequence. The sentences describing the 
events used temporal markers such as “next,” “after this,” and “then” to establish 
discourse cohesion. 
 
 Backward Passages. Two passages with backward narrative organization were 
developed, one from each underlying event sequence. Each sentence was related to the 
next with the initial phrase “before that.” 
 
 Flashback Passages. Two passages with flashback narrative organization were 
developed, one from each underlying event sequence. Three of the 14 underlying events 
were given in the text in flashback form. The event to be given in flashback form was 
omitted from the discourse where it would have occurred in canonical organization. Thus, 
for the event sequence: [E-1] Bear, [E-2] Redwoods, [E-3] Rain, the discourse was given 
as: “She heard a loud noise and turned to see a large black bear breaking into a cabin. A 
little later during the walk, the sky darkened and a light rain began to fall.” Later in the 
narrative, at the point where the flashback occurred in the discourse, cohesiveness was 
established by using appropriate tenses and by referring to the event in the already 
established event structure that immediately preceded the omitted event, for example, 
“Earlier in the walk, right after she had seen the bear, Sara had walked through a grove of 
giant redwoods.” 
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 Embedded Passages. Two passages with embedded narrative organization were 
developed, one from each underlying event sequence. The second sentence in the text 
introduced an event from the middle of the underlying event sequence.  The third 
sentence in the text described the event that followed the middle event in the underlying 
event sequence. The next sentence used standard flashback discourse conventions 
(described in the previous section) to introduce the event that immediately preceded the 
middle event in the underlying event sequence. For example, “About half way through 
her walk, she heard a loud noise and turned to see a large black bear breaking into a cabin 
[middle event in underlying event sequence]. After this, she walked through a grove of 
giant redwoods. Before she saw the bear, she had seen some people skinny-dipping in a 
small pond.”  The narrative continued by introducing new events into the text in 
alternating sequence. Discourse cohesiveness was maintained by tense markers and by 
appropriate reference to the initial (or last) event of the already established event 
structure 
 
 Flashforward Passages. Two passages with flashforward narrative organization 
were developed, one from each underlying event sequence. Three of the 14 events were 
given in flashforward form. Each flashforward event and the event immediately 
preceding it in the underlying structure were introduced into the discourse (before their 
appropriate canonical positions) with an adverbial clause indicating an unspecified period 
of future time. For example, “Next, she saw a flock of geese heading south [event from 
established canonical event sequence]. Later in the day, after she had spotted a campfire 
[event immediately preceding the flashforward event in the underlying event sequence], 
she almost stepped on a rattlesnake while walking through a meadow [flashforward 
event].” Immediately after the flashforward event, the discourse reverted to the original 
time line by introducing the next new event into the discourse with respect to the last 
event in the established event sequence. Thus, for the given example, the narrative 
continued with, “However, immediately after she had seen the geese [established event], 
she met a hiker who told her that the west trail was impassable [next new canonical 
event].” When the discourse progressed to the point in the underlying event sequence 
where the flashforward event should be inserted, the event immediately preceding the 
flashforward event in the underlying event sequence was given, but not the flashforward 
event itself. Thus, for this example, when the appropriate point was reached, the text 
stated, “Next, Sara spotted the campfire up on the ridge. Later during the walk, Sara saw 
the moose crash through a grove of poplar trees.” 
 
Comprehension Test 
Comprehension of the texts was measured by two sets of 20 true-false questions about the 
order of events in the underlying event sequences. Because the events in the underlying 
event sequences did not contain temporally predictable relations, it was necessary for the 
subjects to use the information given in the discourse to establish the underlying event 
sequences. The pairs of events to be tested were selected so that no item tested the pairs 
of events that occurred next to one another in the underlying event sequence. The 
distances between the pairs of events in test materials were such that there were one to 
seven intervening events between the pairs of events in the underlying event sequence. 
Note that the comprehension test never tested information given in literal form in the text. 
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The test items were always tests of subjects’ inferences concerning underlying event 
order. Example test items for the A walk in the forest event sequence were: (T F) 
1. “Sara saw the bear break into the cabin after she almost stepped on the rattlesnake.”;  
(T F) 2. “Sara talked with the hiker before she walked through the redwood grove.”
5
  
 
Procedure 
The subjects were seen in small groups of 5 to10.  The subjects were instructed to listen 
to the tape recording of a passage and were told that they would be asked to answer 
questions concerning the passage after the second presentation. The passage was 
presented twice by a tape recorder, with a 10-s interval between the two presentations. 
Subjects were not allowed to take notes during the two auditory presentations. 
Immediately after the second presentation, the experimenter handed out the booklets and 
subjects answered 20 true-false questions. 
 
Design 
There were five types of discourse organization (canonical, backward, flashback, 
embedded, and flashforward) and two underlying event sequences (A walk in the forest 
and A day in the life of the president) in a factorial design. Both factors were between 
subjects. There were 10 subjects in each experimental condition. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The analyses were carried out on the number of correct responses on the 20-item 
comprehension tests, with maximum possible scores of 20 and a chance score of10 
correct. The means and standard deviations for each type of narrative organization are 
given in Table 1. 
 A two-way analysis of variance (Event Sequence X Discourse Organization) was 
carried out on the comprehension scores. There was a statistically significant effect of 
discourse organization, F(4,90) = 12.03, MSe = 11.85, p < .001. The main effect of event 
sequences (A walk in the forest versus A day in the life of the President) and its 
interaction with discourse organization were not statistically significant. Thus, narrative 
organization had a powerful effect on the comprehension of temporal order in narratives. 
 To determine heterogeneous sets among passage types of discourse organization, 
we used a posteriori Newman-Keuls multiple-range tests. Type of discourse organization 
fell into three groups. The comprehension scores for the canonical passages (17.7) were 
significantly higher (p < .05) than the comprehension scores for all other types of 
discourse organization. There were no significant differences between the comprehension 
scores for the backward passages (14.9), the flashback passages (14.7), and the embedded 
                                                 
5
 To test if subjects can reconstruct event order from the experimental passages, we 
asked a separate group of subjects to read the passages and answer the comprehension 
questions with the passages still available. The mean comprehension scores for each 
passage type were, in order, 19.1, 18.8, 17.3, 18.2, and 15.2 for the canonical, backward, 
flashback, embedded, and flashforward passages. 
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passages (13.6). The comprehension scores for the flashforward passages (10.3) were 
significantly lower than those for all the other types of discourse organization. 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Mean Comprehension Scores for Each Type of Passage Organization 
Comprehension Score 
                        _______________________________ 
 
Passage Type      M    SD 
 
Canonical      17.7    2.0 
Backward      14.9    5.0 
Flashback      14.7    3.2 
Embedded      13.6    4.1 
Flashforward      10.3    2.0 
 
Note. Maximum score = 20. Chance score = 10. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
These results show strong effects of global narrative organization on discourse 
comprehension. 
 The immediate integration principle states that discourse comprehension is 
facilitated by introducing new information so that it can be integrated immediately to an 
already constructed underlying event structure. Violations of the immediate integration 
principle produced the largest effects among the discourse manipulations in this 
experiment, with three flashforward events reducing comprehension scores to almost 
chance levels. The strong effect of violating the immediate integration principle is 
consistent with previous studies of discourse comprehension (Ehrlich & Johnson-Laird, 
1982; Kieras, 1978) and suggests that discourse organizations that cannot be integrated 
into a unified structure in working memory have particularly disruptive effects on 
comprehension. 
 The consistency principle states that discourse comprehension is facilitated by 
organizing discourse so that new information is attached to an old underlying structure 
with a consistent locus. The findings of reduced comprehension scores for the embedded 
texts and for the flashback texts support this principle, because both of these texts violate 
the consistency principle by shifting the focus of structure construction. However, this 
interpretation is not completely unambiguous because the embedded texts also violate the 
isomorphism principle. 
 The finding of reduced comprehension scores for the flashback passages is also 
consistent with this principle because the flashback texts omit relevant information and 
then insert the missing information into the already constructed event sequence. Although 
the flashback passages also violate the isomorphism principle, the results do show that 
subjects’ comprehension of the embedded passages was similar to that of the flashback 
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passages, as we hypothesized.  Apparently, violation of the consistency and isomorphism 
principles in both passages has roughly the same effect on comprehension. 
 It is interesting to note the contrast between flashforward texts that violate the 
immediate integration principle and flashback texts that do not. The reader of flashback 
texts can construct a reasonably coherent model as a unified representation, although it 
might be a temporary one, during the reading at any given point. However, the reader of 
flashforward texts cannot build a unified coherent model until the gap in the time line is 
completely filled. The immediate integration principle is thus particularly important for 
comprehension, and so flashforward texts are more difficult to comprehend than 
flashback texts. 
 The isomorphism principle states that discourse comprehension is facilitated by 
having the discourse structure map the underlying structure. The finding of reduced 
comprehension scores for the backward texts supports this principle because these texts 
obey the immediate integration principle and the consistency principle, but violate the 
isomorphism principle. It appears that subjects find it more difficult to construct an 
underlying directional event sequence when the events are presented in the discourse in 
the reverse order. The data from the backward passages did not completely agree with 
our prediction. Our theory predicted that this type of narrative organization should have 
been significantly easier than the flashback and the embedded passages. 
 
Linear Ordering and Discourse Organization 
This experiment was developed within the general theoretical framework of humanistic 
studies of text (Chatman, 1978; Erlich, 1980) and more specifically within the framework 
of the experimental study of discourse (Graesser, 1981; Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk & 
Kintsch, 1983). However, the processes postulated to underlie the effects of global 
discourse organization on comprehension are presumably general cognitive processes 
that are brought into operation during the process of text comprehension. Thus, it is 
interesting to compare the results of these experiments with an independent line of 
research on linear ordering. 
 There is a fairly large body of literature on the psychological processes involved 
in making comparative judgments (Potts et al., 1978). Within this literature one popular 
research paradigm has been the study of four-term linear order problems. An example of 
a four-term linear order problem is: “The doctor is taller than the farmer. The farmer is 
taller than the soldier. The soldier is taller than the teacher.” The subject can then be 
asked questions about the relative heights of a pair of individuals or be asked to recall the 
entire set of sentences. Within this literature, there is one set of studies that seems to tap 
many of the same psychological processes as the experiment in this article. These 
experiments used an arbitrary underlying linear ordering (as in the previous example) and 
studied all possible orderings of the three pairs (Foos, Smith, Sabol, & Mynatt, 1976; 
Smith & Foos, 1975). Thus, if this example is represented as AB, BC, CD, then this 
ordering of the three pairs is equivalent to our canonical discourse organization. The 
order, CD, BC, AB would be equivalent to our backward discourse organization. The 
order BC, CD, AB would be equivalent to our flashback organization. Note that in this 
case the pair AB is moved from its canonical location. The first two pairs BC, CD build 
up an underlying structure, and finally the omitted pair is attached to the beginning of the 
already constructed structure, as in a flashback narrative. Finally, the order AB, CD, BC 
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is equivalent to our flashforward organization. In this case, the second pair does not 
attach new information to the already constructed structure and so must be held in 
working memory. It is only with the final pair that the underlying structure can be 
constructed. Thus, this ordering is equivalent to a narrative text with a single 
flashforward. 
 Examination of the recall data in Smith and Foos (1975) and Foos et al. (1976) 
shows that the linear order equivalent of our canonical organization gives higher recall 
than any of the other orders. Linear orders that correspond to our backward and flashback 
organizations show roughly equivalent recall. The recall for both of these orderings is 
lower than that for the canonical ordering. Finally, the linear ordering that corresponds to 
our flashforward organization shows the lowest recall of any of the orders. This 
patterning of the linear order data is the same as our results for the comprehension scores 
for the appropriate discourse organizations. This unusual degree of consistency across 
rather different experimental paradigms suggests that both tasks are, in fact, tapping the 
same underlying cognitive processes. 
 
The Function of Discourse Orgamzation 
The finding that a number of violations of canonical discourse organization will reduce 
comprehension leads to an obvious puzzle. Why don’t authors always write texts in 
canonical form? This paradox only arises if one assumes that all texts are designed to 
optimize comprehension. Admittedly, our article focused on only one aspect of event 
order comprehension--how readers construct a mental model of event order from 
narrative text. As we discussed earlier, text com-prehension is very complex and often 
requires many levels of analysis. In order to study the roles and functions of temporal 
order in narrative, one must take into account other functions of temporal manipulation, 
such as discourse force.  Brewer (1980) has argued that although some discourse genres 
are designed primarily for comprehension (e.g., newspaper articles), other genres are 
designed primarily for other functions, such as entertainment or persuasion. Thus, an 
author’s use of a noncanonical discourse organization is not so puzzling if it contributes 
to some discourse function other than comprehension, and these noncanonical 
organizations may also contribute to literary understanding in some broad sense of text 
comprehension. In fact, several authors in the humanistic tradition have analyzed the 
functions of discourse organization in these terms. For example, both Sternberg (1978) 
and Genette (1972/1980) have argued that flashforwards are used to build up suspense in 
the reader about events that are yet to come. Brewer and Lichtenstein (1981, 1982) have 
carried out a series of psychological experiments showing that discourse organization can 
have large effects on the reader’s affect and liking judgments for narratives. Thus, it 
appears that authors may choose a particular form of discourse organization that is not the 
most efficient form for comprehension if that form has some other important discourse 
function. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Overall, this experiment suggests the importance of a careful distinction between 
underlying events and the representation of these events in discourse. It provides 
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evidence that there are powerful effects of global discourse organization on 
comprehension and, more specifically, it shows that the immediate integration principle 
has a strong contribution. It appears that the consistency principle may also provide an 
independent contribution to comprehension, but the data did not provide completely 
unambiguous evidence for the operation of this principle.  Finally, the data show that the 
isomorphism principle has a moderate contribution to comprehension of temporal order 
in narrative texts. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Bock, J. K., & Brewer, W. F. (1985). Discourse structure and mental models. In T. H. 
Carr (Ed.), New directions for child development: Vol. 27. The development of 
reading skills (pp. 55-75). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Brewer, W. F. (1980). Literary theory, rhetoric, and stylistics: Implications for 
psychology. In R. J. Spiro, B. C. Bruce, & W. F. Brewer (Eds.), Theoretical 
issues in reading comprehension (pp. 221-239). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Brewer, W. F. (1985). The story schema: Universal and culture-specific properties. In D. 
R. Olson, N. Torrance, & A. Hildyard (Eds.), Literacy, language, and learning 
(pp. 167-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brewer, W. F. (1987). Schemas versus mental models in human memory. In P. Morris 
(Ed.), Modelling cognition (pp. 187—197). Chichester, UK: Wiley. 
Brewer, W. F., & Lichtenstein, E. H. (1981). Event schemas, story schemas, and story 
grammars. In J. Long & A. Baddeley (Eds.), Attention and performance IX (pp. 
363-379). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Brewer, W. F., & Lichtenstein, E. H. (1982). Stories are to entertain: A structural-affect 
theory of stories. Journal of Pragmatics, 6, 473-486. 
Chatman. S. (1978). Story and discourse. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Clark, H. H., & Haviland, S. E. (1977). Comprehension and the given-new contract, in R. 
O. Freedle (Ed.), Advances in discourse processes: Vol. 1. Discourse production 
and comprehension (pp. 1-40). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
Ehrlich, K., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1982). Spatial description and referential continuity. 
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 21, 296-306. 
Enkvist, N. E. (1981). Experiential iconicism in text strategy. Text, 1, 97-111. 
Erlich, V. (1980). Russian formalism (4th ed.). The Hague; Mouton. 
Foos, P. W., Smith, K. H., Sabol, M. A., & Mynatt, B. T. (1976). Constructive processes 
in simple linear order problems. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Learning and Memory, 2, 759—766. 
Garnham, A., Oakhill, J., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1982). Referential continuity and the 
coherence of discourse. Cognition, 11, 29—46. 
Genette, G. (1980). Narrative discourse (J.E. Lewin, Trans.). Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. (Original work published 1972) 
Graesser, A. C. (1981). Prose comprehension beyond the word. New York: Springer-
Verlag. 
Halliday, M. A. K., & Hasan, R. (1976). Cohesion in English. London: Longman. 
 16 
Johnson, N. S., & Mandler, J. M. (1980). A tale of two structures: Underlying and surface 
forms in stories. Poetics, 9, 51-86. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1980). Mental models in cognitive science. Cognitive Science, 4, 
71—115. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Just, M. A., & Carpenter, P. A. (Eds.). (1977). Cognitive processes in comprehension. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Kieras, D. E. (1978). Good and bad structures in simple paragraphs: Effect on apparent 
theme, reading time, and recall. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 
17, 13-28. 
Kieras, D. E. (1981). Component processes in the comprehension of simple prose. 
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 20, 1—23. 
Kintsch, W., Mandel, T. S., & Kozminsky, E. (1977). Summarizing scrambled stories. 
Memory & Cognition, 5, 547-552. 
Kintsch, W., & van Dijk, T. A. (1978). Toward a model of text comprehension and 
production. Psychological Review. 85, 363-394. 
Kintsch, W., & Vipond, D. (1979). Reading comprehension and readability in 
educational practice and psychological theory. In L.-G. Nilsson (Ed.). 
Perspectives on memory research (pp. 329—365). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Lemon, L. T., & Reis, M. J. (Eds. & Trans.). (1965). Russian formalist criticism: Four 
essays. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
Lichtenstein, E. H., & Brewer, W. F. (1980). Memory foe goal-directed events. Cognitive 
Psychology, 12, 412—445. 
Mandler, J. M., & Goodman, M. S. (1982). On the psychological validity of story 
structure. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 21, 507-523. 
Mandler, J. M., & Johnson, N. S. (1977). Remembrance of things parsed: Story structure 
and recall. Cognitive Psychology, 9, 111—151. 
Miller, J. M., & Kintsch, W. (1980). Readability and recall of short prose passages. A 
theoretical analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and 
Memory, 6, 335-354. 
Morrow, D. G. (1985). Prominent characters and events organize narrative 
understanding. Journal of Memory and Language, 24, 304—319. 
Morrow, D. G. (1986). Places as referents in discourse. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 25, 676—690. 
Ohtsuka, K. (1990). Variation in mental models of text as a function of genre (Doctoral 
dissertation. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1990). Dissertation 
Abstracts International, 51, 1169A. 
Potts, G. R, Banks, W. P., Kosslyn, S. M., Moyer, R. S., Riley, C. A., & Smith, K. 
H.(1978). Encoding and retrieval in comparative judgements. In N. J. Castellan, 
Jr. & F. Restle (Eds.), Cognitive theory (Vol. 3., pp. 243-308). Hillsdale,  NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
Rumelhart, D. E. (1975). Notes on a schema for stories. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins 
(Eds.), Representation and understanding (pp. 211-236). New York: Academic. 
Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 17 
Smith, K. H., & Foos, P. W. (1975). Effects of presentation order on the construction of 
linear orders. Memory & Cognition, 3, 614-618. 
Stein, N. L, & Glen, C. G. (1979). An analysis of story comprehension in elementary 
school children. In R. Freedle (Ed.). Advances in discourse processes: Vol. 2. New 
directions in discourse processing (pp. 53—120). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
Stein, N. L, & Glenn, C G. (1982). Children’s concept of time: The development of story 
schema. In W. J. Friedman (Ed.), The developmental psychology of time (pp. 255-
282). New York: Academic. 
Stein, N. L., & Nezworski, T. (1978). The effect of organization and instructional set on 
story memory. Discourse Processes, 1, 177-193. 
Sternberg, M. (1978). Expositional modes and temporal ordering in fiction. Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Thorndyke, P. W. (1977). Cognitive structures in comprehension and memory of 
narrative discourse. Cognitive Psychology, 9, 77-110. 
Tomashevsky, B. (1965). Thematics. In L T. Lemon & M. I. Reis (Eds. & Trans.), 
Russian formalist criticism: Four essays (pp. 61-95). Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press. (Original work published 1925) 
van Dijk, T. A. (1976). Philosophy of action and theory of narrative. Poetics, 5, 287—
338. 
van Dijk, T. A. (1977). Semantic macro-structures and knowledge frames in discourse 
comprehension. In M. A. Just & P. A. Carpenter (Eds.), Cognitive processes in 
comprehension (pp.3-32). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
van Dijk, T. A., & Kintsch. W. (1983). Strategies of discourse comprehension. New 
York: Academic. 
 
 
APPENDIX: 
EXPERIMENTAL PASSAGES (A WALK IN THE FOREST) 
 
Canonical Passage 
It was a beautiful afternoon, so Sara decided to walk through the forest. While walking, 
she noticed the remains of the old ranger station. Next, she saw a flock of geese heading 
south. She then met a hiker who told her that the west trail was impassable. After this, 
Sara went to her favorite spot, a cliff which overlooked a small village, and sat for a 
while. Next, she saw some people skinny-dipping in a small pond. Hearing a loud noise, 
she turned to see a large black bear breaking into a cabin. After this, she walked through 
a grove of giant redwoods. Then the sky darkened and a light rain began to fall. Next, 
Sara spotted a campfire up on the ridge. Then, while walking through a meadow, she 
almost stepped on a rattlesnake. After this, Sara saw a moose crash through a grove of 
poplar trees.  Sara then circled around Bald Mountain in order to go down into the valley. 
Finally, Sara followed the Cairn River back home. 
 
Backward Passage 
The last thing Sara did the day she walked in the forest was to follow the Cairn River 
back home. Before that, Sara had circled around Bald Mountain in order to go down into 
the valley. Before that, Sara had seen a moose crash through a grove of poplar trees. 
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Before this, while walking through a meadow, she had almost stepped on a rattlesnake. 
Before that, Sara had spotted a campfire up on the ridge. Before this, the sky had 
darkened and a light rain began to fall. Before that, she had walked through a grove of 
giant redwoods. Before this, she had heard a loud noise and turned to see a large black 
bear breaking into a cabin.  Before that, she had seen some people skinny-dipping in a 
small pond. Before this, Sara had gone to her favorite spot, a cliff which overlooked a 
small village, and sat for a while. Before that, she had met a hiker who told her that the 
west trail was impassable. Before this, she had seen a flock of geese heading south.  
Before that, while walking, Sara had noticed the remains of an old ranger station.  Right 
before this, Sara had decided to walk through the forest since it was a beautiful afternoon. 
Flashback Passage 
It was a beautiful afternoon, so Sara decided to walk through the forest. Shortly 
afterward, Sara saw a flock of geese heading south. Next, she met a hiker who told her 
that the west trail was impassable. A little later in the day, Sara saw some people skinny-
dipping in a small pond. After this, she heard a loud noise and turned to see a large black 
bear breaking into a cabin. A little later during the walk, the sky darkened and a light rain 
began to fall. Then, Sara spotted a campfire up on the ridge. Earlier in the walk, right 
after she had seen the bear, Sara had walked through a grove of giant redwoods. 
Immediately after she had spotted the campfire on the ridge, Sara almost stepped on a 
rattlesnake while walking through the meadow. Next, Sara saw a moose crash through 
the grove of poplar trees. Considerably earlier in the walk, right after she had met the 
hiker, Sara had gone to her favorite spot, a cliff which overlooked a small village, and sat 
for a while. Immediately after she had seen the moose, Sara circled around Bald 
Mountain in order to go down into the valley. Much earlier in the walk, right after she 
had decided to walk through the forest, Sara had seen the remains of an old ranger 
station. Finally, immediately after circling Bald Mountain, Sara followed the Cairn River 
back home. 
Embedded Passage 
It was a beautiful afternoon, so Sara decided to walk through the forest. About half way 
through her walk, she heard a loud noise and turned to see a large black bear breaking 
into a cabin. After this, she walked through a grove of giant redwoods. Before she saw 
the bear, she had seen some people skinny-dipping in a small pond. Immediately after she 
had walked through the redwood grove, the sky darkened and a light rain began to fall. 
Earlier, just before she saw the people skinny-dipping, she had gone to her favorite spot, 
a cliff which overlooked a small village, and had sat for a while. Right after the light rain 
had begun, Sara spotted a campfire up on the ridge. Just before she had gone to her 
favorite spot, she had met a hiker who told her that the west trail was impassable. Later, 
right after she had noticed the campfire, she almost stepped on a rattlesnake while 
walking through a meadow. Earlier, just before she met the hiker, she had seen a flock of 
geese heading south. Right after almost stepping on the rattlesnake, Sara saw a moose 
crash through a grove of poplar trees. Earlier, just before she saw the flock of geese, she 
had noticed the remains of the old ranger station. Right after she had seen the moose, 
Sara circled around Bald Mountain in order to go down into the valley. Finally, Sara 
followed the Cairn River back home. 
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Flashforward Passage 
It was a beautiful afternoon, so Sara decided to walk through the forest. Later during the 
walk, after she had seen a moose, Sara circled around Bald Mountain in order to go down 
into the valley. However, right after she began the walk, she noticed the remains of the 
old ranger station. Next, she saw a flock of geese heading south. Later in the day, after 
she had spotted a campfire, she almost stepped on a rattlesnake while walking through a 
meadow. However, immediately after she had seen the geese, she met a hiker who told 
her that the west trail was impassable. After this, Sara went to her favorite spot, a cliff 
which overlooked a small village, and sat for a while. Later in the day, after she had seen 
a bear, she walked through a grove of giant redwoods. However, immediately after she 
went to her favorite spot on the cliff, she saw some people skinny-dipping in a small 
pond. Then, she heard a loud noise and turned to see the large black bear breaking into a 
cabin. Later during the walk, the sky darkened and a light rain began to fall. Next, Sara 
spotted the campfire up on the ridge. Later during the walk, Sara saw the moose crash 
through a grove of poplar trees. Finally, Sara followed the Cairn River back home. 
 
 
